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CONTRACT AND COPYRIGHT
Frank H. Easterbrook*
I ought to begin by confessing that my title Contract and
Copyright is deceptive-though I deny that it violates the
Lanham Act. I will mention other kinds of intellectual property.
And my interest is not limited to contracts, either. But the title is
catchy and captures the main point: that what copyright and
other IP law does is create property rights in information, after
which normal rules of contract and property law determine who
uses that information.
Intellectual property has been a magnet for assertions that,
because law is necessary to create the property right, law also
should determine how that right is used.' But both the premise
and the deduction are faulty. Government has no more role in
creating rights in knowledge than it does in creating rights in
land or artwork-and if it does have such a role, still that does
not imply that IP should be treated differently from physical
assets.
Public officials may be necessary to enforce exclusive rights;
police, courts, and a stable law of trespass are a better way to
keep strangers from squatting in my house than it would be for
me to install a spring gun. So, too, judicial enforcement may be a
better way to stop people from plagiarizing my operetta than
some of the private devices that Gilbert & Sullivan had to adopt
to prevent the appropriation of their work-theft just as
ubiquitous as anything file-sharing networks do today! Public
involvement in defining who owns a Monet canvas is no different
*
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago. This Essay, prepared for the 2005
IPIL/Houston Santa Fe Conference: Transactions, Information and Emerging Law, is
© 2005 by Frank H. Easterbrook.
1.
E.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implicationsfor Contract, 73 Ch.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Yochai Benkler, Free as the
Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom
of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1997). There are overtones of this approach in
one of the other papers prepared for this conference: Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in
Electronic Contracting:Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 Hous. L
REV. 1041 (2005).
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from public involvement in defining who may create
reproductions; both sorts of interventions, like the law against
robbery, force the parties to the bargaining table, where the
Coase Theorem takes over and assets are deployed to their
highest and best uses.
This perspective is popular in legislatures, which regularly
make contracting easier-the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 19882 is an example of statutory property rights to be followed
by private ordering-and in courts as well, for judges regularly
enforce licenses.' It is popular with consumers, who can take
advantage of products at lower prices or in more convenient form.
The iPod and iTunes Music Store would not have been possible
without the combination of digital rights management
(facilitated by the DMCA) and contracts (those on the rightholders' side as well as those on the consumer side). Until
recently, people who wanted music had to choose between
physical media (usually meaning 45-minute albums) and a life of
crime (that is, illegal downloads). Now they still have the old
choices but can purchase single cuts from the iTunes Music store
or rent a library of music by the month from several vendors.
Property rights plus free contracting make this possible. But the
approach is an unwelcome one among many legal scholars, who
see private choice as a threat to their favored end stateswhether that means free IP (Professor Lessig's goal),' their
preferred scope of fair use, or their preferred choice of particular
terms (such as a belief that disputes ought to be settled in person
close to the consumer, rather than remotely, as with the tribunal
that resolves fights about ownership of domain names).
These challenges to private ordering can be arranged under
three headings: competition policy, copyright policy, and contract
policy. I take a cursory look at each. (This is only a cursory look.
It is not a treatise on antitrust or form contracts, but it includes
enough to cover the principal points.)

2.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
3.
1 suppose that I'm obliged to cite ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, (7th
Cir. 1996), which may have led the organizers to invite me to this conference. Many other
decisions are to the same effect.
4.
Expressed bluntly in The People Own Ideas!, TECH. REV., June 2005, at 46, as
well as in his books-including the digitally distributed Free Culture (2004), available at
http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf.
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COMPETITION POLICY

Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.' illustrates the approach
to licensing (which is to say, contracts) that I have in mind. Jane
Aronson devised an ingenious keyholder, which she licensed to
Quick Point for a royalty. The contract provided that if Aronson
obtained a patent the royalty would be 5% of Quick Point's sales;
otherwise it would be 2.5%. Aronson applied for a patent and was
turned down. Quick Point paid the 2.5% royalty until the patent
expired and then stopped. The Eighth Circuit held that patent
and antitrust law trumped the contract; after all, the patent term
is limited, so private parties cannot create an indefinite
monopoly by contract.
The problem with this perspective was that the license did
not create a monopoly. Quick Point could not exclude rivals. It
had a first-mover advantage, nothing more. Aronson and Quick
Point had agreed to pay over time for an idea-a vital input into
Quick Point's production. It could have paid a lump sum for the
ideas, the blueprints, or for that matter the metal and plastic it
used to make the gizmos, without any question under antitrust
or patent law. Brulotte v. Thys Co.,6 which had combined patent
and antitrust law to hold that royalties must stop once a patent
expires, is problematic because it misses this point. Once the
patent expires, the power to exclude is gone and all we have is a
problem about optimal contract design. If it is lawful to set
royalties as "10% during the patent and nothing thereafter," why
is it forbidden to set them at 5% during and after the patent?
Once the patent has expired, there is no market power; and both
sides may gain by longer-term royalties that not only share risk
but also link payments to an idea's staying power.7
In Aronson the Supreme Court grasped this point. It
disposed of Brulotte quickly by observing that a patent had not
issued and then said that details of contracting are up to the
parties. If Quick Point could have paid Aronson a salary plus a
pension, stringing payments over a lifetime, it could pay a

5.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
6.
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964).
7.
This is a point that my court made in Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories,Inc., 293
F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002), which deemed Brulotte wrong in principle-but conclusive on
the lower federal judiciary until the Justices deliver the R.I.P. The point about arranging
a payment stream over time is not novel with the Seventh Circuit. See WARD S. BOWMAN,
JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 232-35 (1973). For
later development, see generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 372-419 (2003).
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lifetime royalty instead. Which arrangement best promotes
innovation is for the parties rather than the courts.
No one ever sacked a judge because he misunderstood
markets. Businesses use all sorts of clever devices to link
payments to success in pleasing customers; these devices applied
to the judicial branch would be called bribes. So it is best to leave
contract design to the market, where incentives are aligned
rather than ignored. Everyone understands this for the branch of
intellectual property that we call trade secrets.8 It is no less true
of copyrights, patents, trademarks, and unclassifiable bright
ideas such as Aronson's design.
I suspect that my view of intellectual property as a normal
form of property subject to normal contract and antitrust rules is
widely shared when the question is whether an acquisition or
merger produces so much market power that it creates a serious
risk of monopoly, or when owners get together to restrict output
(that is, create a cartel). Notice the way I have put this-"get
together to restrict output." Holders of intellectual property often
get together. Blocking or complimentary patents may make
cooperation mandatory, or the high costs of individual
transactions may make blanket licenses attractive. The Supreme
Court held in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS9 that this kind of
cooperation is problematic only if the owners have market power
and output goes down. In other words, it applied the Rule of
Reason rather than a rule of per se illegality to transactions in
intellectual property that could well produce benefits for
consumers as well as producers.
Likewise, I suspect that there is widespread agreement that
the Supreme Court should abolish the rule that patents (and
perhaps copyrights) are presumed to convey market power. °
Most patents and copyrights never produce a penny in royalties;
the big rewards are concentrated in less than 1% of inventions or
publications." There is much more competition in intellectual
property than in gasoline, steel, autos, and many other markets
that have demonstrated that even three or four rivals are quite
enough for vigorous competition. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann
Index for movies, pop tunes, books, or ways to prevent ice cream
cones from dripping is vanishingly small. Rewards to authors

8.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
9.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
10.
The Federal Circuit recently concluded that the subject is out of the hands of
lower courts. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
11.
See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 8-9 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
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and inventors are economic rents, to be sure, but rarely monopoly
rents.
Where views are more apt to differ is in the antitrust
treatment of exclusionary conduct. Here there seems to be a siren
call for intervention. In days gone by people talked about using
"leverage" to extend market power to new products. When
economic analysis exploded the leverage myth, and the Supreme
Court abandoned the doctrine, new claims arose based on
physical bottlenecks (such as the "last mile" of wire in
telecommunications) or complementarities (such as the relation
between software and computer operating systems). These
arguments demand that holders of market power cooperate with
rivals, a la the joint ticket in Aspen Skiing.2
Many of these themes bit the dust last year in Verizon v.
Trinko,"3 when the Supreme Court held that even a monopolist
has no general duty to cooperate with rivals. Again, this is a
general proposition, extending beyond communications systems.
The main goal of antitrust is to compel firms to be rivals;
cooperation is the thing to be feared rather than welcomed.
Anyone who thinks that judges would be good at detecting the
few situations in which cooperation would do more good than
harm has not studied the history of antitrust. The Journal of
Law & Economics, which I used to edit, devotes a couple of
articles every year to examining old antitrust cases and asking
how the judges did. The answer is that they did miserably.
Markets are much better than judges at sifting efficient from
anticompetitive practices. An anticompetitive practice that
produces a monopoly overcharge attracts entry from rivals; a
practice that does not attract such entry most likely is efficient
and could be called "anticompetitive" only because judges and
litigants have misunderstood the market. 4
The big problem with the law of exclusionary practices is
that all competition seeks to undercut and exclude rivals.
Efficient production and lower price is the best exclusionary
tactic, but hardly to be condemned on that account. Other tactics,
such as supposedly predatory prices and clever changes in
product compatibility could in principle exclude without being

12.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
13.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
14.
If you don't want to read the 48 available volumes of the Journal of Law &
Economics, take a look instead at two of my articles: The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1984), and Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS 119 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
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efficient. But how can we tell which is which? If a rival asserts
that a given tactic is exclusionary, there are three hypotheses: it
is exclusionary but also beneficial for consumers because the
defendant has made a better mousetrap; it is exclusionary and
will in the long run lead to higher prices as more-efficient rivals
founder; or it is not exclusionary at all, and the complainant is
just Chicken Little.
How can courts tell the difference? They can't. Every
indicator of exclusion is present with efficient competition. Both
predators and efficient producers undercut rivals and gain
market share. What distinguishes exclusion from efficiency is
what happens in the future: exclusion leads to monopoly
overcharges later, and efficiency does not. Judges are no better
than the rest of us at predicting the future. My colleagues and I
spend most of our time on cocaine prosecutions, employment
discrimination, and the myriad other subjects within federal
jurisdiction. We cannot hope to be students of industrial
organization; and my friends who study that subject are
themselves no great shakes at prediction.
If there is any interesting difference between IP and hard
assets, it is that entry into the knowledge business is easier, and
so competition should be more vigorous and market power easier
to undercut. This suggests less of a role for antitrust in IP than
in old-economy industries.
Judges and (other) enforcers must be wary of claims that
take the form: "Here is a model in which bad results can happen;
let's use the legal system to find out whether they happen." That
approach assumes away the costs of false positives. Because
these costs are high (that's what errors over the last century tell
us), we should not seek to test theory in the halls of government,
where mistakes may be inflicted on the populace. Test models the
professional way, by gathering data, running regressions, and
publishing in professional journals. Before predicting that the
future will be unlike the past-that is, before predicting that
judges and juries will acquire a comparative advantage at
identifying practices that are bound to reduce welfare in the
future-one must do empirical testing. Government fared poorly
between 1890 and 2005 even when the rules were simple. Why
should we think that regulators (including judges) will do well
when the rules become complex, when strategies are designed to
conceal relevant costs, and so on? If the strategies conceal
matters from competitors, then they conceal from judges and
other regulators too.
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Just as we all insist today on proof that a given practice is
bad for consumers, 5 so we must insist on proof that a given legal
regimen implied by an economic model does better than the
unregulated market. To point to a competitive failure is not to
show that regulation is better. That's the Nirvana Fallacy.
Government has its own costs and errors, which may be worse
(and harder to correct) than the problems of markets. Don't
invoke a theory of market failure unless you also have a theory of
regulatory failure-and a way to show that the costs of the
former exceed the costs of the latter.
The Department of Justice has learned, and the Supreme
Court has done nothing in the past decade to give any comfort to
exclusionary-practice claims. In the tobacco predatory-pricing
case," the Court essentially held that no predatory-pricing claim
can succeed unless the industry has entered the recoupment
period. That's the best way to separate wheat from chaff: accept
the low prices and wait to see whether monopoly ensues.
The Court gave a ray of hope to raising rivals' costs theories
by refusing to toss out the third-party repair suit against Kodak
in the copier market. Some have read Kodak" as embracing the
search, through litigation, for raising rivals' costs. I don't think
that this is right. A series of decisions in the courts of appeals18
have held that Kodak is about nasty surprises-about a change
in policy that took advantage of customers who had calculated
life-cycle costs of copiers by assuming competitive repair-and
does not create any obligation to sell parts to one's rivals. 9 It
extends no further than an obligation to live by one's promises. A
firm that promises cheap replacement parts can't pull the rug out
from under those who took advantage; but a firm that always has
consistently sold high-priced peanuts at basketball games, or
otherwise engaged in price discrimination, remains on the right
side of the law.2" A duty to assist rivals has been a bust in earlier
antitrust cases, and came to grief in Verizon v. Trinko.2' Any such
duty would do more to dampen rather than promote competition.

15.
See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
16.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
17.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
18.
One of them was from my court. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs.,
Inc., 73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996).
19.
One may wonder whether Kodak did not err in equating injury with an
antitrust problem; many kinds of loss do not reflect any reduction in output or the welfare
triangle that characterizes antitrust. But this is unimportant for current purposes.
20.
See Elliott v. United Ctr., 126 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1997).
21.
For two good examples from my court, see Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1986) (the defendant's name
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Just a reminder about how this played out in telecom law.
New entrants, encouraged by the breakup of AT&T plus a 1996
statute, want access to incumbents' lines or switching services in
order to reduce the costs of entry and avoid wasteful duplication.
Or so they say; how could one tell whether duplication would be
"wasteful"? Perhaps they want a government-sponsored cartel;
perhaps the entrants want to compel the government to set a
price on the incumbents' network, which they will accept
whenever the government mistakenly sets the price too low. In
either case the regulation would reduce consumers' welfare.
What the entrants do not want is free contracting.
The Supreme Court held in Trinko that (a) a claim of failure
to implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996 arises under
that Act and is not an antitrust problem; and (b) the Sherman
Act discourages cooperation among rivals and does not compel it,
even if this means that a new entrant must build a new plant
from scratch. The contrary claim is in the nature of the old
know
we
that
now
but
point,
bottleneck-monopoly
telecommunications to be competitive-it is hard to argue
natural monopoly when we see rivals building four or five
wireless networks side by side!-even what little intellectual
force these old cases had is gone.
My interest, though, is not so much the adequacy of legal
theory22 as it is the strength of prediction. Recall what a raisingrivals'-costs claim implies: rivals' costs are higher now; prices are
up and quantity down now because elasticity of supply has been
diminished; and if rivals drop out then prices will rise still
further tomorrow. Well, we can test for these predictions.
What do we see in telecommunications? We see considerable
entry, expansion of both infrastructure and sales; we also see
falling prices. There may have been too much entry-though
maybe what dark fiber suggests is just the inevitable error in
predicting future demand. We see WorldCom in bankruptcy, not
sitting pretty with lower costs than rivals. Quite the contrary,
the newer entrants with more modern equipment seem to have
lower average and marginal costs. This is why the ILECs
challenge the TELRIC pricing method under the 1996 Act, for
TELRIC is based on replacement cost-and replacement cost is
less than the sunk base.

alone tells us something about what technological change does to "monopolists"), and MCI
Communications Corp. v.AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
a claim that dominant firms must sell their services to rivals).
A subject that I've discussed elsewhere, such as On Identifying Exclusionary
22.
Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972 (1986).
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Now maybe my understanding of these markets is bad. I
certainly do not want to prejudge any claim pending in another
court. But a simple test based on information picked up from the
popular press does not imply that incumbents' deeds have
reduced output or raises prices.

II. COPYRIGHT POLICY
Many of the academic proposals to limit the role of contract,
and thus establish some protected space for free expressioneither a politically selected scope of public domain, or a
prescribed extent of fair use-rest on one or more of three
propositions:
1. Copyright law serves the public interest by creating an
optimal balance of rights to produce and use information.
Rights to use information that is unprotected by copyright
are part of this optimal balance, which implies that buyers
and licensors of intellectual property must be forbidden to
grant the owner additional rights by contract.
2. A copyright is a monopoly, which therefore needs
regulation.
3. Information is special; unless there is regulation, there
will be deadweight social loss because the marginal cost of
use is zero, and therefore, any positive price (of the sort
that voluntary transactions entail) creates allocative
inefficiency.
I do not think that any of these propositions is correct.
1. It is highly unlikely that copyright law contains an
optimal prescription for information. That is not just a point
about public choice-that is, that statutes are the outcome of a
clash among interest groups rather than of academic
deliberation. It is more a point about the complexity of the world.
Does anyone really believe that one single allocation of rights to
produce and use works best for movies, records, books,
architectural plans, photographs, software, and so on? The
domain of copyright is vast. The most anyone can hope for in a
law is to create a framework-that is, to endow authors with a
set of property rights-and let people work out the details for
themselves. This is of course the fundamental point in Ronald
Coase's essay The Problem of Social Cost, nicely amplified by
3
Calabresi and Melamed in LiabilityRules and Property Rules."

23.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One
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Consider for a moment the world of perfect competition in
classical economics. Price everywhere equals marginal cost, so all
decisions about producing, purchasing, and using goods are both
privately and socially optimal. Now consider the problem for
intellectual property: an idea, a book, a poem, or a piece of
software can be used without being used up. The marginal cost of
producing a new example, after the work has been created, is not
zero, but it is low-substantially below average total cost. To
recover its investment, a producer of intellectual property must
be able to sell at average total cost or more; but if marginal cost
is under average total cost, the price is "too high" to be socially
optimal, for the high price discourages at least some purchases
even though the consumer values the work at more than the cost
of producing an extra copy. That is the problem with which the
law of intellectual property grapples, 4 and no solution can be
praised unconditionally.
Patent law, copyright law, trademark law, and the law of
contracts (of which trade secrets are a branch) create or employ
property rights in information so that the producer of intellectual
property can charge more than marginal cost, and thus cover the
total cost of producing and disseminating the works. Would-be
consumers who value the work at more than marginal cost but
less than average total cost lose out; but if the law were
otherwise different consumers would lose (and lose even more)
because producers would not develop and distribute as many
innovations, plays, drugs, and programs. Just how much above
marginal cost should the price be? No one knows. A patent gives
the inventor the right to exclude competition for 20 years, and
thus to collect an enhanced price for that period. Is 20 years too
long, too short, or just right? No one knows. A copyright lasts the
life of the author plus an additional period that Congress keeps
increasing in response to producers' lobbying. What is the right
length of a copyright? No one knows. A trademark lasts forever
(or at least for as long as the product is made, and the name does
not become generic in the public's mind). A trade secret (such as
the formula for Coca-Cola, or the source code of a computer
program) lasts as long as the developer can keep the secret. Are
these durations optimal? No one knows. How much use, and by
whom, should be permitted without compensation under the fair
use doctrine? No one knows.
By "no one" I mean more than just legislators and judges.
The best academic students of the subject disclaim knowledge. If
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
See LANDES & POSNER, sapra note 7.
24.
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we do not know the answers to these traditional questions, we
certainly cannot proclaim that any given year's legislative choices
are the optimal ones that must be protected from readjustment
by contract. And the statutes on the books sensibly permit
recontracting. I've mentioned the DMCA. Other examples are
legion.
* Trade secrets. A goes to work for B and promises
never to reveal what he learns about B's production
processes. Suppose B is Coca-Cola, and what he
learns is the formula for the beverage. It is written
down but not copyrighted (and if it had been
copyrighted, the copyright would have expired long
ago). Can A then blab to the world? Not a chance.
In Kewanee v. Bicron, the Supreme Court held that
trade secret law, a branch of contract law, can
coexist with copyright. A's contract will be enforced.
*

Work for hire. C signs a contract with D promising
to design a beautiful lamp; D promises to pay a
royalty of 5% in perpetuity. The lamp and its
designs cannot be copyrighted because they are
useful articles; anyone else in the world can copy
and make them. But D must pay the agreed
royalty. This is Aronson. People can form contracts
about intellectual property that is in the public
domain. And good thing too. But for these
contracts, there would be fewer lamps.

*

Ordinary contract. ProCD offers $100 to anyone
who brings it a phone book it does not already have.
E sends in a book. Must ProCD pay? Of course it
must--even though the phone book is in the public
domain, E has created an economic benefit by
bringing it to ProCD's attention. Information is not
free-indeed ignorance is rampant-so we enforce
contracts
that traffic
in "public domain"
information.

2. Copyright as monopoly? Please. Copyright law does not
regulate independent creation. That's why there are so many
detective and romance novels, all fundamentally the same. None
of the authors has market power. So too with a CD packed with
phone books. This is true even for patents. G.D. Searle invented
aspartame, a low-calorie sweetener, but it could not get
saccharin, cyclamates, and sugar out of the market.
Now it is true that the marginal cost of using information
often is low, but we do not define as a monopoly every market in
which P > MC. That's true of many products with economies of
HeinOnline -- 42 Hous. L. Rev. 963 2005-2006
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scale, fixed units of production, or even quasi-rents. Price exceeds
marginal cost for airlines and other businesses with high fixed
costs. It does not follow that they are monopolies.
3. Information is special in the sense that it can be used
without being used up, but this does not mean that use is free.
George Stigler was fond of pointing out that the cost of teaching
and using the Pythagorean Theorem is billions of times greater
than the costs of devising and proving the theorem. And although
one can say that property rights in information are social
constructs, so are property rights in cattle. They set the stage for
contracts; they do not prevent contracts.
Now let me turn to the normative claim that contracts about
public domain information such as phone books or old
Shakespeare plays reduce social welfare by setting a price
exceeding the (presumed) marginal cost of zero, creating
deadweight loss.
As a rule, MC > 0. It is costly to get information into people's
hands. ProCD spent $10 million to compile its database, and
there are annual costs of keeping the data current and
disseminating it. It is costly to disseminate even with a CD in
hand. So too with maps: you can get them on the Internet, often
based on data supplied by the federal government (USGS
topographic maps or satellite photos), but not without either a
subscription fee or exposure to ads that cover the costs of
dissemination.
Given information's existence, why not use it freely? This is
the question asked over and over in the law review literatureand it is ex post. The goal of intellectual property law and
contracts is to create incentives to make and disseminate
information ex ante. If we assume that the information exists and
is in people's hands, we can construct an argument for free use,
but only at the expense of missing the principal point.
What would we like to see happen in intellectual property
markets, where the assembly of even public domain information
can be very costly? The rough answer is Ramsey pricing, a form
of price discrimination in which price is inversely proportional to
elasticity. That's the economic prescription for natural
monopolies, where marginal cost is below average total cost at
the optimal output. With Ramsey pricing, the producer can cover
its costs, and the lower-valuing users can still get the product.
That is what contracts facilitate.
It is what ProCD did. It offered at least three prices: high to
industrial users (who wanted it for mailing lists); middle for
online lookup; and low to consumers for personal use. The
HeinOnline -- 42 Hous. L. Rev. 964 2005-2006
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problem is of course arbitrage. If the consumer users can resell to
high-valuing users, the system breaks down. Thus, the
contractual restriction. So too with ASCAP and the blanket
license: each subscriber pays a different fee, based on how it uses
the music, and this price discrimination allows small customers
(the corner bar) to use music while the fixed costs of authorship
and distribution are collected from radio stations and the TV
networks.
Ex post, one can identify welfare losses from blocking resale.
But suppose the law takes the position that contracts about use
cannot be enforced. What then will happen? There are several
possibilities, which I illustrate with ProCD:
a. Lack of price discrimination may make it impossible
to recover the costs of creating the database, and the
product won't be sold. Welfare loss then would be
much higher than the ex post allocative loss of
enforcing the contract.
b. ProCD may set a single price, but much higher in
order to cover its costs from the industrial users
alone. Then the consumer users simply won't buy.
This has a lower welfare loss than (a), but still more
than the loss from enforcing the license. We see
something of this kind in the market for scholarly
journals, where prices have shot through the roof
because each copy comes with an implied license
(under the fair-use rubric) to make photocopies. If
individual
prevented,
be
could
arbitrage
subscriptions still could be sold at low prices; but
arbitrage is unstoppable, so even publishers that
give discounts to persons (as opposed to libraries)
charge high prices. If contracts about photocopying
could be made and enforced, price discrimination
would be more effective and many consumers could
benefit. Likewise, if every music CD comes with an
inalienable right to make and distribute MP3
versions, producers will raise the price of all CDs
accordingly-and customers who wanted the CD
without a right-to-copy privilege will be worse off (if
they are not priced out of the market altogether).
Enforcing contracts can fix this.
c.

ProCD will not sell CDs, but will be a vendor of
information only, much like mailing list houses and
credit bureaus. You tell it who you want to send to,
and provide it the flyers; ProCD slaps on labels and
sends them out, without giving you a list of
information. This again cuts out consumers, and it
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may also deprive the market of the benefits of the
division of labor. It may be more efficient to have
separate firms in the mailing and data-collection
businesses.
d. ProCD may sell different products for different
prices-a high price for current data with SIC codes,
and a low price for old data without. Then anyone
can use the data freely, but consumers are worse off
than when the shrinkwrap licenses are enforced.
The list can be extended, but I think the point is made.
Contracts augment the opportunity set; and with a larger
opportunity set it is possible to make everyone better off. This is
true of standard-form contracts no less than others. And
intellectual property is no different in this regard from the
warranty that comes in a box with a TV, or the terms on a car
rental agreement. Producers have the same incentives to create
optimal terms as they have to create optimal mixes of product
attributes.
Now I recognize that my colleague Richard Posner is a firm
advocate of the public domain, and on economic grounds. He
thinks (or at least used to think) that excessively strong
protection for intellectual property will gum up the works by
creating the need for thousands of transactions to produce new
intellectual property. 5 Even if the royalties are minimalWilliam Shakespeare's estate could not deny Leonard Bernstein
permission to produce West Side Story, because Bernstein and
his librettist had so many other options for material-the
number of transactions may be high, so transactions costs soar.
Doubtless the rule that stock scenes are not copyrightable would
hold down these costs, but disputes would crop up. Because most
authors are both producers and consumers of intellectual
property, it may make sense to cut down the number of required
transactions by enlarging the public domain or the extent of fair
use. What an author loses on the selling side he gains on the
buying side.
The concern about high transactions costs is a substantial
one, though it diminishes as time passes. Today your computer
can negotiate many of these transactions (as it does with DRM
software) without your knowing, and micro-payment systems
may debit and credit accounts automatically. Technology is
moving us toward the world where transactions costs are close to

25.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
HeinOnline -- 42 Hous. L. Rev. 966 2005-2006

2005]

CONTRACT AND COPYRIGHT

967

zero, and the Coase Theorem can be a reality rather than a
nicely:
it
Professor Picker puts
thought experiment.
"Microconsent, as it were, would make it possible to charge users
small amounts for small uses, and we could march down the
demand curve for a particular work."26
It is ironic that just as a global network and automation are
reducing the costs of contracting, some scholars promote
contract-defeating schemes. One is tempted to think that they
are concerned not about market failures but about market
successes-about the prospect that the sort of world people prefer
when they vote with their own pocketbooks will depart from the
proposers' ideas of what people ought to prefer. Next thing you
know, why, economic transactions between consenting adults will
break out right in public view!
Of course low transactions costs induce owners of IP to make
more demands (they seek royalties only when the payment
exceeds the transactions costs of collection). But it is unlikely
that this process will impede innovation or authorship. Professor
Gomulkiewicz's paper illustrates a principal reason for this. 7
Contracts can drive price down as well as up; licenses can be
designed to allow free access as well as to curtail access. The
General Public License works only because (and only to the
extent that) the law creates and enforces a property right in
information. It is possible to get to free access from a propertyrights starting point; it is much harder to go in the opposite
direction. In other words, more protection of intellectual property
does not imply less public domain; there can be more of each at
the same time.28 Judge Posner and Professor Landes have moved
a considerable distance in this direction in their 2003 book, The
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, and still further
in their article proposing that copyright lasts forever if a market
test shows that the expression retains substantial value. 9

26.
Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the BroadcastFlag: Mechanisms of Consent
and Refusal and the Propertizationof Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 295 (2003).
27.
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free Software
Movement's Constitution,42 HOus. L. REV. 1015, 1021-23 (2005).
28.
This point has been developed nicely in the work of Professor Wagner, one of the
contributors to this symposium. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 457 (2005); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual
Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).
29.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).
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III. CONTRACT POLICY

I devote the least attention to the possibility of fiddling with
particular terms of contracts, because it is not unique to
intellectual property. Litigants, scholars, and occasionally judges
have been complaining about supposedly "unconscionable" terms
in "contracts of adhesion" for a very long time. This was the
theme state courts used a century ago when they refused to
enforce agreements to arbitrate; why, it would be unconscionable
for one side to foist second-class justice on another. After the
Federal Arbitration Act required courts to enforce these clauses if
the parties wanted them," the same claim was made for limited
warranties, or clauses in insurance or auto-rental contracts.
A belief that statutes (or judges) can improve the lot of
consumers by adjusting contractual terms is persistent yet
unfounded. Contractual terms are product attributes-no
different functionally from the quality of a car's tires, a TV's
capacitors, or a software package's features-so the assertion is
equivalent to a contention that used to be made in antitrust law
but has not been heard since the 1950s: that monopolists would
make inferior products. Why, exactly? The idea was that the
monopolist would save on manufacturing costs but charge the
same price. That won't work; an inferior product draws a lower
price even in monopoly. Today all students of industrial
organization agree that both competitive and monopolistic firms
make the product that consumers prefer, and then sell it for what
the traffic will bear. That strategy maximizes profits.
Just so with contractual terms. If Hertz Corporation can
exploit its customers despite competition from Avis and National,
the best way to do so is to offer the combination of auto and
contractual terms that the customers want, and then charge a
high price. If Hertz substitutes a cheaper car, or inferior terms,
customers notice and pay less or turn to Avis. And if the
customers need help recognizing their predicament, Avis will tell
them. This is no less true of forum-selection clauses in

30. Not everyone has noticed. Echoes of these arguments can be heard today in
employment discrimination cases. Despite the fact that organized labor is as enthusiastic
about arbitration as are employers, courts occasionally refuse to enforce these
agreements. My court is not among those that think they should rewrite contracts one
term at a time. See, e.g., Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004); Carbajal v.
H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004); Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning
& Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir, 1997).
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shrinkwrap licenses than of forum-selection clauses in cruise

tickets.3 '
Suppose software customers value local dispute-resolution
services by more than the incremental cost required to provide
them (compared with arbitration in the vendor's home town).
Then vendors will fall over one another to provide local hearings,
because doing so enables them to increase price by more than the
additional cost. If they continue to use "inferior" terms, they lose
out. Self-interest aligns their behavior with consumers' interests.
(You can hear Adam Smith saying: "It is as if there were an
invisible hand. . ..")So when a court comes along and "fixes"
what it deems to be an inappropriately pro-seller term, what it is
usually doing is compelling the seller to supply something that is
worth less to the consumer than the marginal cost of its
provision. (Otherwise, to repeat, the seller has not been
maximizing profits, and few judges who intervene in the cause of
consumers do so because they think that sellers are failing to
maximize investors' returns!) The price must rise, and by more
than the consumers' benefit. The consumers have been made
worse off.
In a sentence: As long as price terms remain open, judicial
adjustment of contracts' terms will make consumers worse off.
Judges cannot redistribute income from producers to consumers;
that requires taxes or some other involuntary mechanism.
Everyone would agree with this if the proposal were to require
every play to have five acts (giving the theatergoer "only" four
acts is exploitation!), or every opera to include a ballet, or every
book to exceed 350 pages, or every television to include goldplated MonsterTM cables rather than cheap aluminum wiring;
judicial design of products' attributes would be a calamity. That's
equally true of contractual terms.
True it is that few consumers read the terms; but then few
look inside their TV sets to see what kind of wiring it uses, or
whether refrigerators use the best connectors between their pipes
and the air compressor. My expensive super-automatic coffee
maker has cheap plastic on the outside but costly, precisetolerance metal parts in the brew assembly on the inside, just the
reverse of what one would think if consumers value only what
they see at first glance. One of the lessons from the economics of
information is that it does not take many savvy shoppers to drive
price and quality toward the optimal mix that consumers favor.3 2
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
31.
32.
See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV, 630 (1979).
HeinOnline -- 42 Hous. L. Rev. 969 2005-2006

970

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

142:4

And what holds for price holds for contractual terms as well;
George Priest's elegant demonstration of this for warranty terms
needs no elaboration here.3 Shopping and searching are
becoming steadily less expensive, thanks to the Internet. It
follows that whatever justification there once was to manipulate
contractual terms is evaporating.
Sometimes the shoppers are professionals, and when this is
so the use of identical forms is the best way to protect the
amateurs. Most suppliers of intellectual property sell to
corporations, universities, and individual buyers on the same
contractual terms. Terms that satisfy professional buyers are
likely to be efficient. Consumers then get the benefit of the pros'
efforts. This process is similar to the way in which professional
investors' efforts protect amateurs: when securities sell to all at
the same price, amateur investors indirectly receive the benefit of
information available to professionals. Identical contractual
terms for professional and amateur buyers serve the same
function.
When the terms are efficient (or even when they are not),
there is unlikely to be any benefit in legal rules that require
consumers to assent one term at a time. Having to initial an
auto-rental contract in five places does no one any good; just so
with proposals to require consumers to click "OK" five times after
scrolling through boxes of text on their screen. Why force every
buyer to be a "shopper"? Why assume that buyers' time has no
value? When market processes produce generally efficient
contracts, forcing every consumer to approve multiple clauses one
at a time has net costs even if each consumer's opportunity cost
of time is small.
IV.

CONCLUSION

My principal suggestions follow from this understanding about
the relative (in)competenice of public actors. Three propositions sum
up what I know, or think I know, about wise public policy with
respect to IP licensing and related subjects."

33.
George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297 (1981); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets
for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV.
1387(1983).
34.
Those who have looked at Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, will discover from this concluding section that I have
not learned much in the intervening decade.
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1. Make rules clearer, to promote bargains. "We" don't know
what is best, but in a Coasean world the affected parties will by their
actions establish what is best.
It is awfully hard to know what the optimal bundle of rights for
authors is. When there is ignorance, it is best to give more rights to
authors. Why? Because if the best arrangement turns out to be free
distribution, then private transactions may produce this result
when the statute assigns the rights to authors; but if the best
arrangement turns out to be some fee for distribution and a lower
price for use, it is extremely hard to get to this state of affairs if the
statute cancels the distribution right. Private transactions could
move the right back to authors only if the parties have contractual
relations (for example, patrons of the opera may agree not to tape
the performances). We must bear in mind the high possibility of
error in the original specification of entitlements-a risk especially
high in a legislative world dominated by interest-group politics. The
risk of error should lead to initial assignments that are easy to
reverse, so that people may find their own way with the least
interference.
2. Createproperty rights, where now there are none--again to
make bargainspossible.
One common response to a proposition of this sort is that
holders of rights in intellectual property are bound to use them to
cut out low valuing users, or to squeeze profits from information
already in the public domain. I find it odd that this response
appears so often in the law reviews, where it is self-refuting. Every
law review article is copyrighted. This means that the author could
insist that the law review pay, say, $5000 for publication rights, and
that Lexis pay another $5000 (plus $100 per "hit") for the right to
make the text available electronically. But of course authors don't
do this. They submit articles without payment, from either law
reviews or the electronic services. Perhaps one could infer that the
authors know something about the value of their intellectual
property. But another possible inference is that when free
distribution is socially optimal, people will not enforce their
property right to withhold publication or demand fees. If you start
from property rights you can negotiate for free distribution; if you
start from an absence of property rights, it is very hard to get to the
best solution when a charge is optimal.
3. Create bargaininginstitutions.
Computers offer many opportunities to do, at next to no cost,
sort
of thing the Copyright Clearance Center tried and failed to
the
do for photocopies. Consider, for example, the question whether a
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publisher of content on the Internet wants to authorize the making
of copies-and, if so, the making of copies that can be recopied, or a
single copy for use on a local computer, or only wants to authorize
viewing on screen. All are logical possibilities, each rational for
some authors, or for any given author at different times. How is it
possible to specify which is which and to collect payment?
The answer lies in a convention-a protocol under which each
file contains its own instructions on this question, and programs
know how to interpret them. You are familiar with such
conventions. When your modem calls a remote modem, the two
devices engage in elaborate interrogation to discover what speed to
use and what compression and error-correction algorithms are in
place. An international standards-setting organization agreed on
the language; private firms all over the world have decided
whether, and to what extent, to use this agreed language for
communications. Some firms have come up with their own
extensions, outside the organization's framework. Just so with the
Internet's core communications protocol (TCP/IP) and pagedescription language (HTML). Encryption technology for digital
rights management is similar.
A standards-setting organization could prescribe, say, 20
different copying rules-sets of permission and payment terms.
There may be competing organizations, with their own standards.
Each Internet server and client would understand these terms and
carry out the negotiation automatically, remitting any payment to
an agreed depository by secure methods. Your future electronic copy
of Moore's Federal Practice may come tagged with instructions that
tell your computer how many times it can be copied, and to whom it
may be redistributed. Or you may receive a copy that is locked to
your hard disk or, as with Adobe's latest DRM system for digital
books, is limited to a certain number of computers. You register
each of your computers in Adobe's database, and Acrobat unlocks all
of the books you have purchased.3 5

35. This is, by the way, how I came to read Professor Lessig's article mentioned
supra note 4. I subscribe to Technology Review through Zinio, which uses Adobe's DRM
system to encrypt and distribute electronic magazines. I can read Technology Review on
any of my computers. Alas, I cannot print it; MIT, which publishes Technology Review,
had disabled printing. (The Adobe DRM system allows all sorts of fine gradations; one
common limit is the ability to prinit up to 50 pages but no more.) I would have liked to be
able to print Lessig's article so I could refer to it at this conference without using my
portable computer, but I would not be willing to pay very much for that feature. This is
the only time I have wanted to print an article during my two years as a subscriber.
Disabling print doubtless enables MIT to sell the digital version for the low price that
induced me to subscribe. If I really needed to hold Lessig's article in my hand, I could
have made a photocopy from the (considerably more expensive) hard copy of the magazine
to which the University of Chicago's libraries subscribe.
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These, then, are my propositions. We live in a world of
ignorance. We can expect ignorance about the full consequences and
optimality of legal rules to be as prevalent in the 21st century as it
has been in the past. We can expect academics, legislators, and
judges to have in the future the same comparative disadvantages,
vis-et-vis the market, that they have had in the past. In a world of
imperfect knowledge-that is, in our world-you can benefit from
clear rules, property rights, and institutions that promote
negotiation and enforce the resulting contracts.
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